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NOTE
GENETIC PLASTIC SURGERY: HOW NEOEUGENICS
CREATES A CULTURE OF STAGE MOMS

JAMES A. LONG∗

INTRODUCTION
The developments being made in the area of genetic engineering foster
as many promises as they do cautions. If these developments continue,
bioengineers will have the ability, like never before, to completely alter
entire gene pools. 1 Given this awesome, and somewhat frightening
potential, the law must be ready to address these neoeugenic procedures
such as genetic engineering and their proper limits within society.
Neoeugentics, when used for cosmetic purposes and even for certain noncosmetic purposes, can and should be regulated by states because it directly
violates the personal autonomy of the unborn child, indirectly violates the
personal autonomy of mothers, and it satisfies the Supreme Court’s
compelling state interest test.
Legislators are faced with a number of considerations when deciding if
and to what extent neoeugenic procedures should be regulated or even
required. Among these are the woman’s autonomy in making reproductive
decisions, the subjectivity of the unborn child, the degree to which the
police powers would allow the state to require neoeugenic procedures, and
whether there is a compelling state interest that would justify a regulation of
neoeugenics. One immediate example is evidence that a directive approach
(meaning gene therapy is expressly recommended) compromises a
woman’s autonomy; 2 therefore, a legislator can support a regulation of
∗
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1. See, e.g., Susannah Baruch et al., Genetics and Public Policy Center, Human Germline
Genetic Modification: Issues and Options for Policymakers 14 (2005), available at
http://www.dnapolicy.org/images/reportpdfs/HumanGermlineGeneticMod.pdf.
2. See Sonia M. Suter, A Brave New World of Designer Babies?, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
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neoeugenics requiring doctors to take a non-directive approach (meaning
the doctor merely informs the patient of her options) in order to respect the
woman’s autonomy. This paper attempts to provide a framework for
dealing with these types of considerations. Given this country’s colorful
history in the eugenics era, building a solid legal framework will help
ensure that the mistakes of the past are not revisited.
Through an analysis of the history of eugenics and its modern
counterparts, Section I of this paper will illustrate that neoeugenics is not
insulated from the mistakes of the past, as its proponents claim. Rather,
modern programs such as genetic engineering, contraception, and prenatal
testing are haunted by the same racist and elitist overtones as compulsory
sterilization and marriage-prohibition laws. 3 Section II will analyze the
principle of autonomy and demonstrate how the Supreme Court’s
conception of autonomy is premised upon a false anthropology. Section III
will examine the extent to which the state can regulate neoeugenics
consistent with a compelling state interest.
A parent’s decision to choose genetic engineering for their child is
likely to be considered a fundamental reproductive right, and any regulation
of neoeugenics will, therefore, be subject to strict scrutiny. Although I
propose several compelling interests, two stand paramount: preserving
patient autonomy and preserving the unborn child’s autonomy. First, the
autonomy of the patient requires that doctors adopt a non-directive
approach to genetic counseling. Second, to the extent that neoeugenic
procedures assume the life or birth of an unborn child, the child’s autonomy
interests become increasingly relevant.
I.

HISTORY OF EUGENICS

Despite its “good” etymology, 4 fewer words are charged with more
negative history than the word “eugenics.” It has traveled along the road of
good intentions since the late nineteenth century, leaving in its wake
oppression, racism, coercion, and genocide. Championed by the United
States as a means to ensure ethnic purity, eugenics inspired the Asian
Exclusion Act, 5 the forced sterilization of more than 60,000 people, and

897, 919–20, 924–28 (2007) [hereinafter Suter, Designer Babies] (commenting on the effects of a
directive approach).
3. This analysis is not intended to support a theory that marriage prohibition laws and
compulsory sterilization are morally equivalent to genetic engineering, prenatal testing, and
contraception. I simply wish to underscore the fact that neoeugenics is, sadly, motivated by the
same stereotypes and elitism which inspired the universally decried eugenics of the 1920’s—albeit
at an individual rather than state level. The cause for such persistent motivations is the policy of
“crypto-eugenics” which replaced eugenics in aftermath of World War II.
4. The word eugenics literally means “good birth.”
5. Immigration Act of 1924, Pub. L. No. 139, 43 Stat. 153.

100325 Long Ready for Proofs (Young)

200x]

DESKTOP PUBLISHING EXAMPLE

10/2/2011 8:05 PM

205

restricted marriages for the “feebleminded.”6 Adolph Hitler was inspired by
U.S. policies and sterilized 3.5 million “undesireables” before he
implemented the “final solution.” 7 In the aftermath of World War II and the
horrors of the Holocaust, the United States began to abandon its official
eugenics program—or so it seemed. 8 While many of the official eugenic
programs were dissolved, some remained under the guise of “reproductive
rights.” 9
Now, at the dawn of the twenty-first century, eugenics is more alive
than ever. Many scholars attempt to distinguish the eugenics of old versus
the “neoeugenics” of the modern era, with some making a distinction
between positive versus negative eugenics and others defending
neoeugenics as a fundamental reproductive right. 10 Proponents of
neoeugenics believe that, by correcting the false science of the early
twentieth century and removing the instruments of eugenics from the state,
neoeugenics can offer many of the promising benefits of eugenics without
the collateral violations of human rights.11
A. Classic Eugenics
The word eugenics was first used by Francis Galton, a cousin of
Charles Darwin, who defined eugenics as:
[T]he science of improving stock, which is by no means confined to
questions of judicious mating, but which, especially in the case of
man, takes cognisance of all influences that tend in however remote
a degree to give to the more suitable races or strains of blood a
better chance of prevailing speedily over the less suitable than they
otherwise would have had. 12

6. PHILIP REILLY, THE SURGICAL SOLUTION: A HISTORY OF INVOLUNTARY STERILIZATION
IN THE UNITED STATES 2, 26–27 (1991).
7. Phillip R. Reilly, Eugenics, Ethics, Sterilization Laws, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ETHICAL,
LEGAL AND POLICY ISSUES IN BIOTECHNOLOGY 204, 210 (2000); see also Suter, Designer
Babies, supra note 2, at 901–02.
8. Cf. MATTHEW CONNELLY, FATAL MISCONCEPTION: THE STRUGGLE TO CONTROL
WORLD POPULATION 112 (2008) [hereinafter CONNELLY, FATAL MISCONCEPTION] (noting that
in the aftermath of World War II eugenics as a way to shape populations was not discredited but
found solid ground in the birth control movement).
9. See Note, Regulating Eugenics, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1578, 1586–92 (2008) [hereinafter
Regulating]; see generally CONNELLY, FATAL MISCONCEPTION, supra note 8, at 104–09;
MARGARET SANGER, AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY 106–08 (Dover Publications, Inc. 1971) (1938)
[hereinafter SANGER, AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY]; MARGARET SANGER, MY FIGHT FOR BIRTH
CONTROL 83–84 (Maxwell Reprint Company 1969) (1931) [hereinafter SANGER, BIRTH
CONTROL].
10. See, e.g., Suter, Designer Babies, supra note 2, at 917; Regulating, supra note 9;
ANDREA TONE, DEVICES & DESIRES: A HISTORY OF CONTRACEPTIVES IN AMERICA 141 (2001).
11. See generally, Regulating, supra note 9, at 1582.
12. FRANCIS GALTON, INQUIRIES INTO HUMAN FACULTY AND ITS DEVELOPMENT 17 n.1
(2d. ed. 1911), reprinted in EVERYMAN’S LIBRARY: SCIENCE (Ernest Rhys ed. 1943).
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Inspired by Galton’s eugenics, Annie Besant and Charles Bradlaugh sold
133,000 copies of Charles Knowlton’s Fruits of Philosophy—a pamphlet
that addressed the need to help people have sex without having children.13
Besant argued in favor of contraception as a way to stop the proliferation of
the weakest members of society. 14 Her notoriety, coupled with powerful
international advocates,15 helped motivate the developments in
contraceptive techniques that resulted in the decline of Europe’s
population. 16
When most countries in Europe adopted military conscription, the
decline of population became a matter of national security. 17 France, for
example, gave mothers free medical care for childbirth.18 Likewise,
Germany mandated maternity leave with pay. 19 In addition to low birth
rates between 1870 and 1914, Europe experienced the greatest mass
emigration of Europeans in history—thirty-two million people. 20
While the European continent suffered dramatic declines in population,
the United States was experiencing a boom. Receiving immigrants from
Europe on the east coast and immigrants from Asia on the west, America’s
population began to increase rapidly. 21 Concerned not with the rate of
growth but with the composition and quality of growth, American eugenic
activists took aim at the Chinese, 22 depicting them as “disease-carrying
cosmopolitans who excelled in economic competition and conspired to rule
the world.” 23 The Workingman’s Party in California began to campaign for
immigration reform under the slogan “the Chinese must go!” 24
Massachusetts Institute of Technology president Francis Walker infamously

13. ROGER MANVELL, THE TRIAL OF ANNIE BESANT AND CHARLES BRADLAUGH 44–47
(1976); CONNELLY, FATAL MISCONCEPTION, supra note 8, at 18–19.
14. See MANVELL, supra note 13, at 86–92 (Besant drew international attention when she
and Bradlaugh were convicted of publishing an obscene pamphlet); see also High Court of
Justice, THE TIMES OF LONDON, June 20, 1877.
15. Annie Besant was joined by Margaret Sanger, Elise Ottesen-Jensen, Marie Stopes,
Baroness Shidzué Ishimoto, and Lady Rama Rau. CONNELLY, FATAL MISCONCEPTION, supra
note 8, at 24.
16. By 1880, the population of Europe reached its peak and began to decline. See DEBORAH
DWORK, WAR IS GOOD FOR BABIES AND OTHER YOUNG CHILDREN: A HISTORY OF THE CHILD
WELFARE MOVEMENT IN ENGLAND 1898–1918 3–7 (1987); see also CONNELLY, supra note 8, at
20.
17. CONNELLY, supra note 8, at 24; DWORK, supra note 16, at 3.
18. CONNELLY, supra note 8, at 25.
19. Id.
20. WALTER NUGENT, CROSSINGS: THE GREAT TRANSATLANTIC MIGRATIONS, 1870–1914
41–43 (1992); DAVID HELD ET. AL., GLOBAL TRANSFORMATIONS: POLITICS, ECONOMICS, AND
CULTURE 291–92 (1999).
21. CONNELLY, supra note 8, at 32–34.
22. Id. at 32–38.
23. Id. at 36.
24. ALEXANDER SAXTON, THE INDISPENSABLE ENEMY: LABOR AND THE ANTI-CHINESE
MOVEMENT IN CALIFORNIA 104–06, 122 (1971).
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noted that immigrants were “beaten men from beaten races; representing the
worst failures in the struggle for existence.” 25 In his view the “‘vast hordes
of ignorant and brutalized peasantry’ would depress wages and discourage
native stocks from forming new families.” 26 “Yellow peril” spread to
Europe as Asian immigrants filled the void of Europe’s declining
population.
The population struggles of the western world fueled the science of
eugenics as eugenicists began to discuss ways of increasing desirable
populations and decreasing the undesirable. 27 Beginning with Germany’s
Society for Race Hygiene, national organizations emerged to unite
eugenicists. 28 In 1912, London hosted the first international meeting of
eugenicists. 29 Biologist Raymond Pearl 30 told the Eugenics Congress that
politicians and the public should give scientists “a chance at directing the
course of human evolution.” 31
As the promises of eugenics became apparent its popularity grew. By
1910, the Index for Periodical Literature placed eugenics as the second most
popular topic in print media. 32 Eugenics’ popularity provided a favorable
political climate for passing eugenic laws, and the United States became the
first country to pass laws aimed at reducing the fertility of “ethnic
minorities, the poor, [and the] otherwise ‘unfit.’” 33 Connecticut spearheaded
the eugenic laws movement by passing the first marriage prohibition law in
1896. 34 In 1907, Indiana became the first state to pass a sterilization law,
and, by 1917, fifteen more states followed suit.35 Altogether, more than
25. Francis A. Walker, Restriction of Immigration, THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY, June 1896, at
822–29; CONNELLY, supra note 8, at 37–38.
26. Walker, supra note 25, at 822–29; CONNELLY, supra note 8, at 38.
27. Cf. CONNELLY, supra note 8, at 50.
28. Id. at 43.
29. Id.; see also, First Eugenics Congress: Four Hundred Delegates In London—Americans
to Read Papers, N.Y. TIMES, July 25, 1912, at 5.
30. Pearl was one of the highest paid professors at Johns Hopkins and a member of the
governing councils of the National Academy of Sciences and the National Research Council.
31. Raymond Pearl, The First International Eugenics Congress, 36 SCIENCE 395 (1912).
32. Phillip R. Reilly, Eugenics, Ethics, Sterilization Laws, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ETHICAL,
LEGAL AND POLICY ISSUES IN BIOTECHNOLOGY 205 (Thomas H. Murray & Maxwell J. Mehlman
eds. 2000). Not only was eugenics represented in popular literature but it also was represented in
popular culture. For example, the American Eugenics Society began hosting “fitter family”
competitions in the “human stock” sections at state fairs. See DANIEL J. KEVLES, IN THE NAME OF
EUGENICS: GENETICS AND THE USES OF HUMAN HEREDITY 61–62 (1985).
33. CONNELLY, supra note 8, at 49.
34. KEVLES, supra note 32, at 99. By 1914, thirty states passed marriage prohibition laws for
“idiots,” the insane, “feebleminded,” “unfit,” and those afflicted with venereal disease. Indiana’s
law passed in 1905 forbade the marriages of mentally deficient and drunkards because it was
thought that they carried a “transmittable disease.” Id.
35. KEVLES, supra note 32, at 100. Iowa passed the broadest sterilization law which
“compelled the sterilization of twice-convicted sexual offenders, of thrice-convicted other felons,
and of anyone convicted just once of involvement in white slavery.” Madison Grant—a New York
lawyer and treasurer for the second and third international eugenics conferences—argued that
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60,000 people fell victim to compulsory sterilization laws—7,500 in
California alone.36 Congress passed the Immigration Act of 1924, 37 which
resulted in “not just a drastic reduction in immigration from southern and
eastern Europe, but the expulsion of immigrants [who] the courts did not
consider to be white and the forced sale or seizure of their property.” 38 The
United States’ aggressive eugenic legislation did not go unnoticed by
European countries—especially Nazi Germany.
American eugenic laws encouraged Nazi Germany to implement
increasingly radical measures.39 Adolph Hitler praised American
immigration restrictions in Mein Kampf and Nazi sterilization laws gave
public praise to American eugenic pioneers. 40 Hitler explained that the
“planned control of population movements” was necessary to preserve the
quality and quantity of the Aryan race. 41 American eugenicists voiced their
support for Hitler’s race policy. 42 Senior representative of the American
eugenics movement in Berlin, Clarence Campbell, for example, stated that
Hitler’s eugenic programs “[set] the pattern which other nations and other
racial groups must follow.” 43 In the aftermath of World War II and its
atrocities, American eugenicists began to distance themselves from the
classic eugenic policies that inspired Nazi Germany. 44
sterilization offered “a practical, merciful and inevitable solution” to the problem of a wide circle
of “social discards” including “the criminal, the diseased and the insane [as well as] . . . weaklings
. . . [and] worthless race types.” MADISON GRANT, THE PASSING OF THE GREAT RACE: OR, THE
RACIAL BASIS OF EUROPEAN HISTORY 51 (2d ed. 1918).
36. Reilly, supra note 32. For California, see CONNELLY, supra note 8, at 48. The most
infamous compulsory sterilization was Carrie Buck who was sterilized in 1927 after the United
States Supreme Court validated Virginia’s compulsory sterilization statute. See Buck v. Bell, 247
U.S. 200 (1927). Carrie Buck died in 1983. On May 2, 2002 the State of Virginia erected a
historical marker at Carrie Buck’s birthplace. At the dedication, Virginia Governor Mark R.
Warner offered the “Commonwealth’s sincere apology for Virginia's participation in eugenics.”
Dave Reynolds, The Eugenics Apologies: How a Pair of Disability Rights Advocates Scored the
First State Apology for Eugenics, and What They Have Planned Next, RAGGED EDGE ONLINE,
Nov.–Dec. 2003, http://www.ragged-edge-mag.com/1103/1103ft1.html.
37. It is also known as the “National Origins Act of 1924” and the “Asian Exclusion Act of
1924.” See note 5.
38. CONNELLY, supra note 8, at 48. Before the Immigration Act of 1924, immigrants from
eastern European countries (Romania, Bulgaria, Turkey) were emigrating to the U.S. at a rate of
15,000 people per year. After the Act, their immigration was limited to 1,500 per year. Likewise,
Italian immigrants averaged 92,000 per year before the Act and 7,000 after. U.S. Bureau of the
Census, Historical Statistics of the United States: Colonial Times to 1957 56 (1960).
39. Cf. STEFAN KÜHL, THE NAZI CONNECTION: EUGENICS, AMERICAN RACISM, AND
GERMAN NATIONAL SOCIALISM 23–26 (1994); CONNELLY, FATAL MISCONCEPTION, supra note
8, at 105. The Nazi sterilization law enacted in 1933 resulted in the forced sterilization of 3.5
million people and led to the secret euthanistic killing of the disabled. See Reilly, supra note 32.
40. ADOLPH HITLER, MEIN KAMPF 439–40 (Ralph Manheim trans., Houghton Mifflin 1971)
(1925). On sterilization see KÜHL, supra note 39, at 37–39.
41. HERMANN RAUSCHNING, THE VOICE OF DESTRUCTION 136–38 (1940).
42. See generally KÜHL, supra note 39, at 27–37.
43. Id. at 34.
44. Id. at 100; see also TONE, supra note 10, at 144.
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B. Classic Eugenics to Crypto-eugenics
Despite outward signs that eugenic programs were closing, many of the
policies still remained operative. For example, the Immigration Act of 1924
was not repealed until 1965, 45 and, while the Eugenics Record Office was
officially closed in 1939 and people no longer received “feebleminded”
diagnoses, mandatory eugenic sterilizations continued until 1983.46 Many
eugenicists sought legitimacy by forging alliances with birth controllers and
pronatalists 47 to regain popular support—a move Margaret Sanger, the
founder of Planned Parenthood, had desired since she coined the term “birth
control” in 1914. 48
Sanger desperately sought recognition and support from eugenic
scientists. 49 She believed that the growth of her birth control movement
depended on “promoting birth control not merely as a personal choice, but
as a public good.” 50 Insisting “there has never been any birth control
movement that did not lay stress on the eugenic side of it,”51 Sanger was
successful in convincing eugenicists Edward East and Raymond Pearl that
“providing the poor and ethnic minorities with birth control would reduce
differential fertility.” 52 Agreeing with Sanger’s analysis, Pearl said
It is not only desirable in the eugenic interest of the race to cut
down, indeed completely extinguish, the high birth rate of the unfit
and defective portions of mankind, but it is also desirable . . . to
reduce the birth rate of the poor, even though that unfortunate
moiety of humanity be in every way biologically sound and fit. 53
With the help of Pearl and East,54 Sanger was able to network with medical
45. The Immigration Act of 1924 was repealed by the Immigration and Nationality Act of
1965, Pub. L. No. 89–236, 79 Stat. 911 (1965).
46. See Suter, Designer Babies, supra note 2, at 917. On eugenic sterilizations see Reilly,
supra note 32, at 211 (“Although one cannot point to a moment in which state-sanctioned
eugenical sterilization in the United States ended, a satisfactory date is 1983 when a class-action
lawsuit brought by women in Virginia who had been sterilized without their consent while in state
facilities was settled.”); See Poe v. Lynchburg, 518 F.Supp. 789 (1978).
47. The SHORTER OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY defines “pronatalist” as “[o]f or pertaining
to the encouragement of the practice of having a large family, esp. by the State; advocating large
families.” SHORTER OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY ON HISTORICAL PRINCIPLES 2366 (5th ed.
2002).
48. See CONNELLY, supra note 8, at 51, 53–54, 105–06; SANGER, AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY,
supra note 9, at 107–09; (Sanger tried several names before deciding on “birth control” such as
“race control” and “family control”); see also Sanger, BIRTH CONTROL, supra note 9, at 83.
49. CONNELLY, supra note 8, at 51–54.
50. Id. at 43.
51. Id. at 53; see generally TONE, supra note 10, at 145.
52. CONNELLY, supra note 8, at 63 (noting that Sanger also suggested parents should be
required to apply for babies as immigrants applied for visas).
53. RAYMOND PEARL, THE BIOLOGY OF POPULATION GROWTH 171 (1925).
54. East claimed that birth control is essential to a successful eugenic program and advocated
“promot[ing] birth control at the lower end of the social scale.” See EDWARD M. EAST, MANKIND
AT THE CROSSROADS 299, 303 (1923).
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doctors, including the leaders of the Committee on Maternal Health and the
American Medical Association.55
Aiding the birth control movement was the economic crisis of the Great
Depression. 56 With millions unemployed and parents struggling to provide
for their families, “it began to appear ludicrous to deny them the means to
prevent unwanted births. . . . [T]here was increasingly an expectation that
parents should have no more children than they could manage.” 57 With
popular support, and medical and scientific backing, Sanger’s birth control
movement was able to solidify support and legitimacy among population
activists such as Gunnar and Alva Myrdal and Sir William Beveridge.
Together, they created the “family planning” movement. 58
According to the Myrdals “[t]he genius of family planning was to imply
that parents would do the planning” while in reality “social engineers”
would “create the conditions that would shape parents’ preferences (and in
some cases compel more rational choices).”59 For many eugenicists, the
“future of family planning depended on their ability to manipulate a large
segment of society they considered to be unfit for parenthood.”60 As C. P.
Blacker 61 wrote, “defectives being, for the most part, readily suggestible
and open to the influence of the people around them, should in most cases
be easily persuaded.” 62
Under the leadership of C.P. Blacker, the International Planned
Parenthood Federation 63 began a policy of “crypto-eugenics” in which
55. CONNELLY, supra note 8, at 63. In 1937, family planning under a doctor’s supervision
received the seal of approval of the American Medical Association. See id. at 109.
56. CONNELLY, supra note 8, at 107. See also TONE, supra note 10, at 151.
57. CONNELLY, supra note 8, at 83 (emphasis added).
58. Id. at 82; see also LINDA GORDON, WOMAN’S BODY, WOMAN’S RIGHT: A SOCIAL
HISTORY OF BIRTH CONTROL IN AMERICA 344–48 (1977).
59. CONNELLY, supra note 8, at 104. This approach is similar to the “fitter family”
competitions during the late 1920’s.
60. Id. at 107 (citing Alva Myrdal, The Swedish Approach to Population Policies, 30 J.
HEREDITY 113 (1939)).
61. C.P. Blacker was chosen by Margaret Sanger as the first director of the International
Planned Parenthood Federation (IPPF).
62. CONNELLY, supra note 8, at 107. The family planning movement acted as a catalyst to
blunt the negative effects the Holocaust should have had on eugenics. In fact, Margaret Sanger
used the holocaust to justify eugenics in a speech delivered to the Planned Parenthood Federation
of America, pointing to “the death camps as conclusive proof of the ‘widespread devaluation of
human lives’ and the urgent need for policies to improve them, beginning with the sterilization of
those with ‘dysgenic qualities of body and mind.’” See id. at 167–68.
63. The Planned Parenthood Federation of America (PPFA) was founded by Margaret Sanger
in 1923 under the incorporated name of the “American Birth Control League” (ABCL) when
Sanger opened her first birth control clinic in Brooklyn, New York. The ABCL changed its name
to PPFA in 1942. See CONNELLY, supra note 8, at 109. The International Planned Parenthood
Federation (IPPF) was founded by Margaret Sanger in 1952 just two years after her speech to the
thirteenth annual Planned Parenthood Federation of America (PPFA). Together, the IPPF and
PPFA form the entity formally known as “Planned Parenthood.” See CONNELLY, supra note 8, at
167–68.
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“[y]ou seek to fulfill the aims of eugenics without disclosing what you are
really aiming at and without mentioning the word.”64 The Planned
Parenthood Federation of America used a similar strategy—its director,
William Vogt, for instance, carefully disguised an anti-Asian policy as a
maternal health policy. 65
The family planning movement gave eugenicists the mantel of personal
autonomy to disguise their racist and elitist agendas. This was particularly
true in the United States where Dutch “sex reformers” considered
“Americans to be ‘obsessed’ . . . with ‘attacking population problems, and
especially those of coloured people.’”66 What differentiated eugenics from
family planning was not its objectives, but rather the means which it
employed to achieve its objectives.67 By taking the eugenic instruments out
of the hands of the state and giving them to private institutions, eugenicists
now had the basis for claiming eugenics as a reproductive right. 68 This
difference caused some scholars to refer to this new movement as
neoeugenics. 69

64. CONNELLY, supra note 8, at 163.
65. Id. at 165–66 (“It is commonly said in the Orient that we want to cut their population
because we are afraid of them . . . but the program can be sold on the basis of the mother’s health
and the health of the other children.”).
66. Id. Margaret Sanger openly targeted the poor while maintaining “life is so easy and
charming and warm and bright for those who have money.” See CONNELLY, supra note 8, at 99.
See also Brief Impressions of Japan (Apr. 10, 1922), in THE MARGARET SANGER PAPERS (Esther
Katz et al. eds.), microfilmed on THE MARGARET SANGER PAPERS, Reel 70, Fiche 110–20 (1996);
cf. TONE, supra note 10, at 145–46.
67. Both the family planning movement and eugenics sought to reduce the fertility rates of
minorities and otherwise unfit, the difference being family planning sought to convince
individuals to sterilize themselves (i.e., choose birth control) and eugenicists sought statemandated sterilizations. See, e.g., CONNELLY, FATAL MISCONCEPTION, supra note 8, at 107
(discussing the need for the family planning movement to manipulate large populations of the
“unfit”); cf. TONE, supra note 10, at 144–46 (discussing birth control as a way to racial
improvement).
68. The history of reproductive rights in America centers on the ideals of personal autonomy
and individual freedom. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Southern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505
U.S. 833, 851 (1992). When the eugenic movement began to shy away from state-mandated
eugenics and focus on private institutions like Planned Parenthood, eugenicists could then
articulate why their methods should be seen as consistent with personal autonomy and individual
freedom, thus paving the way for eugenic programs like abortion, contraception, and prenatal
testing to be considered fundamental reproductive rights. See the discussion infra p ### on cryptoeugenics for a fuller discussion.
69. See, e.g., Suter, Designer Babies, supra note 2, at 922.
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C. Crypto-eugenics to Neoeugenics 70
The founder of eugenics, Francis Galton, never supported compulsory
eugenic programs. Rather, he believed that if the public was properly
educated, they could be trusted to make the right eugenic reproductive
decisions. 71 Galton’s optimism is reflected in the neoeugenics movement.
Neoeugenics is best described as a “voluntary improvement of the human
species at the individual level.” 72 Although many agree that there are
similarities between neoeugenics and classic eugenics, they argue that
neoeugenics (unlike classic eugenics) is morally justifiable because its
focus is on autonomy and individual freedom rather than state-compelled
sterilization. 73 Yet some scholars believe that crypto-eugenic policies still
influence neoeugenics. Professor Suter of George Washington University
Law School writes:
[A]lthough the choice is always the individual’s, pressures from
providers and society may have coercive effects. In the era of
compulsory sterilizations, efforts were made to persuade
individuals to make particular reproductive choices. Likewise, in
the midst of the voluntarism of neoeugenics, efforts are made to
persuade individuals to make particular reproductive choices. Thus,
although the landscapes of eugenics and neoeugenics are clearly
different, the distinctions are not as extreme as commentators often
suggest. 74
The problem with neoeugenics is not that it attempts to achieve some of
the same ends as classic eugenics. After all, the classic eugenics movement
did actually seek some valid ends, such as the eradication of diseases. The
problem with neoeugenics is that, since its implementation in the 1930’s,
crypto-eugenics has created the social pressures that shape our reproductive
choices. 75 For example, one scholar recognized that when “‘choices’
become available, they all too rapidly become compulsions to ‘choose’ the
socially endorsed alternative.” 76 This compulsion to choose the socially
70. The term neoeugenics will be defined as found in Suter, Designer Babies, supra note 2.
While many scholars use different terms, I believe they all describe the same thing. Some use
positive versus negative eugenics; some call the new eugenics movement “liberal eugenics”
because it “advocates genetic modification of humans on liberal political grounds.” Regulating,
supra note 9, at 1582. I have chosen to use the term neoeugenics because I believe that it
accurately describes the movement.
71. Suter, Designer Babies, supra note 2, at 922.
72. Id.
73. See, e.g., Regulating, supra note 9, at 1582; cf. Lene Koch, The Meaning of Eugenics:
Reflections on the Government of Genetic Knowledge in the Past and the Present, 17 SCI. IN
CONTEXT 315, 317 (2004).
74. Suter, Designer Babies, supra note 2, at 938.
75. Cf. Ruth Hubbard, Legal and Policy Implications of Recent Advances in Prenatal
Diagnosis and Fetal Therapy, 7 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 201, 210 (1982).
76. Id.
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endorsed alternative is most profoundly demonstrated in the area of prenatal
testing (discussed infra in Section II). 77
Before a legal framework can be laid to deal with neoeugenics, an
outline of the kinds of neoeugenic procedures currently or potentially
available should be discussed. Below is a discussion of five neoeugenic
procedures.
1. Amniocentisis and Choronic Villus Sampling
Some of the most common procedures of the neoeugenic era are
diagnostic tests such as amniocentesis and chorionic villus sampling, 78
which, due to numerous social pressures, have become a routine part of
pregnancy. 79
2. Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis
One option gaining momentum is preimplantation genetic diagnosis of
embryos created through in vitro fertilization. Once an embryo is tested and
found to be free of “genetic abnormalities,” it can be “transferred to the
woman’s uterus for gestation.” 80 But, like prenatal testing, preimplantation
genetic diagnosis is not a treatment for disease; rather, preimplantation
genetic diagnosis merely “overcomes some of the emotional complications
associated with prenatal testing and termination. . . . [T]hose who believe
that life begins at conception may still be troubled by the prospect of
embryo destruction if the embryo is found to carry disease genes.”81
Another developing area of neoeugenics will reduce the cost of testing and
make “prenatal diagnosis even more desirable and broader in its scope.”82
3. DNA Chips
In less than a decade, “next-generation technologies that make reading
DNA fast, cheap and widely accessible” will become available.83 Michael J.
77. See, e.g., id. at 210; see generally Sonia Mateu Suter, The Routinization of Prenatal
Testing, 28 AM. J.L. & MED. 233, 255–57 (2002) [hereinafter Suter, Routinization].
78. Amniocentesis is a “procedure in which a small sample of amniotic fluid is drawn out of
the uterus through a needle inserted in the abdomen and is then analyzed to detect genetic
abnormalities in the fetus or to determine the sex of the fetus.” THE AMERICAN HERITAGE
STEDMAN’S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 36 (2d ed. 2004). Chorionic villus sampling is a “prenatal test
to detect birth defects that is performed at an early stage of pregnancy and involves retrieval and
examination of tissue from the chorionic villi.” Id. at 153. Chorionic villi are any of the “fingerlike
projections of the chorion of the embryo.” Id.
79. Suter, Designer Babies, supra note 2, at 923; see also Suter, Routinization, supra, note
77, at 255–56.
80. Jeffrey R. Botkin, Ethical Issues and Practical Problems in Preimplantation Genetic
Diagnosis, 26 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 17 (1998).
81. Suter, Designer Babies, supra note 2, at 930–31.
82. Id. at 931.
83. George M. Church, Genomes for All, SCI. AM., Jan. 2006, at 47.
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Malinowski describes “DNA chips” that “can be used to test the samples of
individuals for the presence of thousands of identified genetic variations.” 84
In essence, scientists will know the type of child two people will have
before an embryo is even created. But these procedures do nothing to treat
genetic diseases; they only provide evidence of genetic abnormalities. Gene
therapy and gene transfer, on the other hand, have the potential to treat
some genetic diseases. 85
4. Gene Therapy and Transfer
Despite neoeugenicists’ optimism, the science of gene therapy has
progressed very little since the 1990’s.86 This may be due, at least partially,
to the debate among neoeugenicists over its potential uses. Apart from
merely treating diseases, gene therapy could be used to enhance healthy
genes by altering them to improve height and athleticism, or even cosmetic
enhancements like facial structure and eye color. 87 These enhancements are
advocated by scholars such as Professor Ronald Dworkin, 88 who justifies
genetic enhancements on philosophical grounds: he argues that society is
morally obligated to provide genetic enhancements so that children can
choose broader life plans and have a greater chance of success.89
The technology may become so advanced that gene therapists could
choose to manipulate genes at the somatic cell level (making the
enhancements uninheritable) or at the germline level (making the genetic
alterations inheritable).90 With this technology, neoeugenicists could
actually achieve what they set out to do in the 20s and 30s—eradicate
unwanted gene sequences (albeit at the individual, rather than the state,
level). 91
5. Human Genome Project
Complimenting gene therapy are developments in the Human Genome

84. Michael J. Malinowski, Law, Policy, and Market Implications of Genetic Profiling in
Drug Development, 2 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 31, 40–41 (2002).
85. Suter, Designer Babies, supra note 2, at 933.
86. Id. at 932.
87. Id. at 933–34, n.195.
88. Ronald Dworkin is a Professor of Jurisprudence at University College London and New
York University School of Law. UCL Faculty of Laws, Ronald Dworkin,
http://www.ucl.ac.uk/laws/academics/profiles/index.shtml?dworkin (last visited Mar. 4, 2010).
89. RONALD DWORKIN, SOVEREIGN VIRTUE: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF EQUALITY
448–52 (2000).
90. Susannah Baruch et al., Genetics and Public Policy Center, Human Germline Genetic
Modification: Issues and Options for Policymakers 14 (2005), http://www.dnapolicy.org/images/
reportpdfs/HumanGermlineGeneticMod.pdf (“If and when it occurs, germline genetic
modification would involve introducing a new genetic sequence into a person's germline cells that
could be passed to future generations.”). See generally id. at 13–24.
91. Cf. Suter, Designer Babies, supra note 2, at 937–38.
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Project. The late Daniel E. Koshland, former Editor-in-Chief of Science,
hypothesized that the Human Genome Project had the potential to provide
solutions to many of today’s social problems, such as homelessness and
crime, by eliminating the illnesses which in large part lead to them. 92 This
medicalization of social problems—casting them as primarily genetic—is
strikingly similar to the position espoused by classic eugenicists. 93
As these new age technologies become mainstream, the social pressures
to use them will increase.94 These social pressures affect neoeugenics to the
extent that they impair the autonomous choices of people who use
neoeugenic procedures. 95 Therefore, while neoeugenics is rooted in the
ideals of personal autonomy and informed consent, the choices that
motivate neoeugenic treatments are the aggregate result of what social
engineers have predetermined constitutes the good. 96
II. THE HUMAN PERSON AND AUTONOMY
Personal autonomy plays a central role in due process jurisprudence. It
is difficult to assess however, the importance personal autonomy plays in
rendering a decision. For example, the Supreme Court in Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey implied that everything
under the sun is encompassed by the due process clause because “[a]t the
heart of liberty is the right to define one’s own concept of existence, of
meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life.” 97 But, in
Washington v. Glucksberg, the Court adamantly downplayed the role of
autonomy in due process jurisprudence opining: “That many of the rights
and liberties protected by the due process clause sound in personal
autonomy does not warrant the sweeping conclusion that any and all
important, intimate, and personal decisions are so protected.”98 However, in
Lawrence v. Texas the Court again reiterated the sweet mystery of life and
held that personal autonomy is a core liberty interest at the heart of the due
process clause. 99 One thing is certain: courts will always struggle with
balancing personal autonomy on one hand with the state’s interests on the
92. Koshland hypothesized that psychological disorders such as schizophrenia and the like
are responsible for many social problems including homelessness. The Human Genome Project
may rid society of social problems to the extent that it can ameliorate or obliterate the
psychological disorders that cause such social problems. Daniel E. Koshland, Sequences and
Consequences of the Human Genome, 246 SCIENCE 189 (1989).
93. Suter, Designer Babies, supra note 2, at 940.
94. See Suter, Routinization, supra note 77, at 255–57.
95. E.g., id. at 255 (“. . . [e]ven when women understand conceptually that they have a
choice, social norms and beliefs about what is best for their child may make choice illusive”).
96. See, e.g., id. (discussing how the “routinization” of prenatal testing creates a situation
where “true choice often gives way to the illusion of choice”).
97. Planned Parenthood of Southern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992).
98. 521 U.S. 702, 727 (1997).
99. 539 U.S. 558, 574 (2003).

100325 Long Ready for Proofs (Young)

216

UNIVERSITY OF ST. THOMAS LAW JOURNAL

10/2/2011 8:05 PM

[Vol. X:N

other. If neoeugenic procedures qualify as a fundamental right protected by
the due process clause, then overcoming a state regulation of neoeugenics
requires walking that delicate balance.
This section demonstrates how our conception of autonomy is false
and, therefore, to the extent that the Court would rely on this false
conception, it is wrong. This section implores the Court to move from an
“atomistic” conception of autonomy and move towards a “relational”
autonomy. It also argues that, as a matter of public policy, doctors should
refrain from taking a directive approach when proscribing neoeugenic
procedures, and legislators should prohibit cosmetic genetic enhancements.
Professor Suter points out that “[o]ur culture seems to have adopted an
‘atomistic conception of self-definition, in which the individual shapes
herself without reference to others.’” 100 The Supreme Court has adopted this
atomistic view in Casey and Lawrence. 101 But the atomistic conception of
autonomy is flawed to the extent it assumes that human persons act in
isolation from each other.
Analyzing this atomistic conception of autonomy requires evaluating
what it means to be a person. 102 Once one understands the nature of the
human person, a truer conception of autonomy emerges. Only with this
fuller understanding can the implications of genetic engineering be clearly
seen.
A. The Subjectivity of the Human Person
Karol Wojtyla 103 begins his analysis of the human person with the
observation that the person is both a subject and an object of action.104 As a
subject, the person is “an entity which exists and acts in a certain way.” 105
As an object, the person exists within a world of objects and is an objective
particular person. 106 But the person is not simply a subject; he is a human
subject with the ability to reason, distinguished from “even the most
advanced animals by a specific inner self.” 107 Unlike animals, a person
100. Suter, Designer Babies, supra note 2, at 951 (quoting Sonia M. Suter, Disentangling
Privacy from Property, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 737, 772 (2004) [hereinafter Suter,
Disentangling).
101. Casey, 505 U.S. 851; Lawrence, 539 U.S. 574.
102. See Suter, Designer Babies, supra note 2, at 951.
103. Karol Wojtyla was ordained a priest in 1946 and ordained a Bishop in 1958. Elevated to
Cardinal in 1967, he was later elected 264th Pope of the Catholic Church under the name John
Paul II. Holy See Press Office, His Holiness John Paul II Short Biography,
http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/john_paul_ii/biography/index.htm (last visited Mar. 4, 2010).
104. KAROL WOJTYLA, LOVE AND RESPONSIBILITY 21–23 (H. T. Willetts trans., rev. ed.
1981) (1960).
105. Id. at 21.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 22. Human persons do not only act and react in a passive sense; human persons are
as Boethius described them—individual beings of a rational nature (individua substantia
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“does not only intercept messages which reach him from the outside world
and react to them,” rather, the human subject perceives an object and
because of his inner life, is aware that he perceives an object. 108 Thus, he is
capable of making value judgments about the objects he perceives, or, as
Wojytla would say, “he strives to assert himself, his ‘I’ [into the world].”109
Man is a person precisely because of his interior life.110
By virtue of the specific interior life, the human person has the power
of self-determination and exercises his subjectivity by free will. The
collateral effect of the human person’s power of self-determination is this:
“No one can substitute his act of [free] will for mine.” 111 All human
relationships are predicated upon the principle that each person remains
independent in his actions. 112 Because the human person is not merely the
subject of action but can at the same time be the object of action, there are
many ways in which the human person can be “used.”
To “use” something means to employ some object as a means to an
end. 113 In this sense, the number of objects that a person uses in his daily
life as a means to an end is potentially limitless. But when he uses other
persons as a mere means to an end—when he objectifies them—he denies
them their subjectivity and does violence to their very nature as human
persons. 114 In other words, he denies them their power of self-determination
and substitutes his will for theirs. Therefore, when the object of a person’s
action is another human person, he must never use that other person as a
mere means to his own ends; rather, he must respect that person’s own
subjectivity—he must treat that person as an end.
Immanuel Kant came to the same conclusion when he discussed his
categorical imperative.115 Kant proposes that one must “act in such a way
that you always treat humanity, whether in your own persons or in the
person of any other, never simply as a means, but always at the same time
rationalis naturae). The human person’s rational nature fosters an interior life or an inner self that
distinguishes him from even the most advanced animals. Id.
108. Id. at 23
109. Id.
110. WOJTYLA, supra note 104, at 23.
111. Id. at 24.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 25.
114. Id. at 27. Not every instance of using another human person does violence to their
dignity. For example, the employer uses the employee and vice versa. In this type of relationship,
the employer could easily use the employee as a mere means to an end; but, if they arrange their
association such that both are ordered to the other’s good, then, even though they may be “using”
one another as a means to an end, their act of use is actually an act of love. The employee works
diligently for the good of the employer, and the employer pays a just wage for the good of the
employee. It is only when people are used as a mere means to an end that an act of usury does
violence to the dignity of the human person. See id. at 29.
115. IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 77 (H. J. Paton
trans., Harper and Rowe, 1964) (1948).

100325 Long Ready for Proofs (Young)

218

UNIVERSITY OF ST. THOMAS LAW JOURNAL

10/2/2011 8:05 PM

[Vol. X:N

as an end.” 116 In this way, Kant not only affirms the autonomy of the human
person, but also implicitly rejects atomistic autonomy. If atomistic
autonomy were true, then man would only relate to other people as a
subject of action and not at the same time as an object of action. Since the
human person is both a subject and object of action, atomistic autonomy is
necessarily false.
Personhood is “‘bound up and expressed in relation to others’ and does
not focus on individual goals that are disaggregated from community and
personal history.” 117 Analysis of neoeugenics through the lens of “relational
autonomy” focuses on the “development and expression of the relational
self,” whereas an “atomistic autonomy” analysis focuses on self-definition
to the exclusion of any relational considerations.118
B. Relational Autonomy
Relational autonomy reveals “subtle and contextual” problems with
neoeugenics apart from its effects on the atomistic self. 119 This is important
particularly in the realm of reproductive decisions that affect not only the
subject making the decision, but also the object of the decision. In some
cases, the way in which we exercise our autonomy has profound effects on
other people. While this is particularly true of the disabled community, 120 it
also affects parents and the types of decisions they make for their
children. 121 If genetic engineering becomes possible, social pressures may
encourage parents to cosmetically engineer their children, much like social
pressures encourage parent to undergo prenatal testing. 122 Thus, as a matter
of public policy, doctors and medical boards should refrain from taking a
directive approach in prescribing neoeugenic procedures and should restrict
neoeugenic procedures like genetic engineering when used for cosmetic
purposes.
1. The Disability Rights Approach
Like eugenics of old mentioned at the beginning of this paper, Professor

116. Id. at 96.
117. Suter, Designer Babies, supra note 2, at 953 (quoting Suter, Disentangling, supra note
100, at 763).
118. See Suter, Designer Babies, supra note 2, at 954.
119. Id.
120. See, e.g., Darrin P. Dixon, Informed Consent or Institutionalized Eugenics? How the
Medical Profession Encourages Abortion of Fetuses with Down Syndrome, 24 ISSUES L. & MED.
3, 3–4 (2008) [hereinafter Dixon, Informed Consent] (discussing the effect direct and indirect
influences of medical professionals have on the termination of fetuses with Down syndrome).
121. See, e.g., Suter, Designer Babies, supra note 2, at 963–64 (discussing the effects parents’
overbearing expectations have on their children).
122. Id. at 935–37 (arguing that “advancing technologies and cultural norms may exert a
coercive effect on individuals’ reproductive choices”).
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Suter underscores one of the “key criticisms” of neoeugenics under a
relational autonomy analysis—many reproductive decisions are motivated
by “prejudice and stereotypes of different groups.” 123 “Majority views
regarding disabilities often reflect the able-bodied’s misperceptions and
stereotypes about the experiences of the disabled, in large part because of
lack of experience with the disabled community.” 124 For example, despite
the reality that “many individuals with Down [s]yndrome can become semiindependent and with good medical care, can live into adulthood,” 90
percent of all babies diagnosed with Down syndrome are aborted 125 due
primarily to the “direct and indirect influences of medical professionals.”126
Thus, rather than being motivated by accurate information, many mothers
choose to terminate their pregnancies due to a doctor’s own stereotype and
lack of experience treating children with Down Syndrome. 127 Unlike the
atomistic conception of autonomy, analysis under a relational autonomy
approach must not only consider whether or not the woman has accurate
information, but also the effect of the woman’s action in relationship to her
community. 128
By choosing to terminate a fetus with an unwanted genetic condition or
trait, the woman “defines the ‘unfit’ in terms of that [condition] or trait,”
which “may devalue the lives of those with the trait.”129 Those in the
disability movement have long recognized that social barriers create
disability and “that the difficulties of living as a disabled person are due to
discrimination and prejudice, rather than impairment.”130 Exemplifying this
123. Id. at 955.
124. Id.
125. Amy Harmon, Prenatal Testing Puts Down Syndrome in Hard Focus, N.Y. TIMES, May
9, 2007, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/09/us/09down.html?ex=1336363200&en=
ccf8eef18ff478e4&ei=5088.
126. See Dixon, Informed Consent, supra note 120, at 3–4.
127. Id.
128. Cf. Suter, Designer Babies, supra note 2, at 955–57. Suter argues that those who we
chose to terminate via abortion in some sense labels who society as a whole considers disabled or
unwanted. In the case of genetic engineering, those traits we choose to enhance exclude certain
traits and individuals, and may have a corrosive effect on how society views those persons with
traits that are selected against. Thus, when making reproductive decisions women are not only
affecting their own bodies and the life of their child, but they are also shaping their community.
129. See Suter, Designer Babies, supra note 2, at 955. See also Robert Wachbroit, What is
Wrong with Eugenics?, in ETHICAL ISSUES IN SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH: AN ANTHOLOGY 334
(Edward Erwin et al. eds., 1994) (stating that what is “prima facie wrong” with using sex selection
to select males “is that it insults the dignity of women; it demeans the value of being female”);
Mary B. Mahowald, Aren't We All Eugenicists? Commentary on Paul Lombardo’s “Taking
Eugenics Seriously”, 30 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 219, 230–34 (2003) (noting that expressivists argue
that prenatal testing sends the message to people with disabilities that their lives are not worth
living).
130. Tom Shakespeare, Eugenics, Genetics and Disability Equality, 13 DISABILITY & SOC'Y
665, 669 (1998). See also Adrienne Asch, The Human Genome and Disability Rights, DISABILITY
RAG AND RESOURCE, Jan.–Feb. 1994, at 12 (arguing that the premise of the disability rights
movement is that persons with disabilities are disadvantaged far more by negative social attitudes
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principle is the fact that deafness is viewed as a minor problem rather than a
major misfortune in communities where deafness is common. 131 The fact
that those with disabilities are impaired much more by social prejudice and
value judgments than by their actual disability highlights the role that
individual value judgments play in shaping who and what we call
“disabled.” 132 Hence, relational autonomists are right to be concerned about
the effects genetic engineering and in vitro fertilization may have on those
who have traits that are selected against.133
2. Genetic Plastic Surgery
Analysis of genetic engineering must hinge on the nature of the human
embryo. If a human embryo is merely an object of action, then genetic
enhancements of it are morally neutral.134 But if the human embryo is both a
subject and an object of action, then it is a human person and, whenever
human persons are the object of our actions, we must never use them as a
mere means to achieve our own ends.135 If an embryo were simply an
object, then it would make no sense to discuss how genetic enhancements
might broaden its autonomous life choices—much like it makes no sense to
discuss how reupholstering a chair would broaden its autonomous life
choices. Since genetic engineering is aimed at providing the embryo with
broader potentiality with regard to the types of choices it will eventually be
able to make, those who advocate for genetic engineering must believe that
the embryo is not merely an object, but in some sense, it must also be a
subject—the kind of entity that is capable of making choices. Thus, genetic
engineering must presuppose the existence of a human person and as a
result the embryo cannot be used as a mere means to achieve an end.136
Those who support genetic engineering as a fundamental reproductive
right argue that parents should have the right to equip their children with
certain traits to enhance their potential for success and for making
than by their disabilities). In a more recent case, Sarah Palin (the 2008 Republican U.S. VicePresidential nominee) knowingly had a Down syndrome baby: Trig. Citing the effect Plain’s
decision would have on society’s conception of Down syndrome should she get elected, a doctor
in Canada worried that fewer Downs babies would be aborted. See John Flynn, Unlikely to
Survive, ZENIT, Sep. 21, 2008, http://www.zenit.org/article-23672?l=english.
131. See Bob Sapey, From Stigma to the Social Exclusion of Disabled People, in STIGMA AND
SOCIAL EXCLUSION IN HEALTHCARE 270 (Tom Mason et al. eds., 2001) (noting that relatives and
friends value individuals with disabilities for qualities other than their impairments; however, to
outsiders, individuals with disabilities continue to illicit negative responses).
132. Cf. Suter, Designer Babies, supra note 2, at 956.
133. Cf. id.
134. Cf. WOJTYLA, supra note 104, at 25–27. Wojtyla argues that it is precisely because man
is an object and a subject that we ought to not to use him as a means to our own ends. Id. Thus, the
moral implications of how we use a fetus change depending on whether or not they are merely an
object or if they are also a subject. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
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autonomous life choices.137 Some supporters, like Professor Dworkin, make
moral claims for a right to genetic engineering. 138 Professor Dworkin bases
his moral claim on two principles. First, that “it is objectively important that
any human life, once begun, succeed rather than fail,” and second, every
person has the right to “define, for him, what a successful life would be.”139
I agree with both principles; however, since the goal of genetic engineering
is to allow parents to choose cosmetic, intellectual, and physiological
enhancements for their child before the child is even born, the only types of
genetic engineering that fit into Dworkin’s analysis are preventative
measures aimed at curing diseases. 140 Since each person should “define, for
him, what a successful life would be,” 141 there is no moral argument for
cosmetic enhancements because it is impossible to know what the
autonomous life choices of an embryo would be before he or she is born.142
Decisions to provide cosmetic enhancements for a child, therefore, must
only be motivated by life choices that the parents themselves would have
chosen. 143 This phenomenon is already taking place in field of plastic
surgery. 144 Motivated by their own conceptions of beauty and social
137. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 92 (rev. ed. 1999) (explaining that a rational
actor wants to ensure that her descendants have the capabilities to pursue their preferred plans of
life. Because enhancing a child’s natural talents neither infringes on others’ liberty nor makes
anyone worse off, “society is to take steps at least to preserve the general level of natural abilities
and to prevent the diffusion of serious defects.”).
138. RONALD DWORKIN, SOVEREIGN VIRTUE: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF EQUALITY
449, 452 (2000).
139. Id. at 448–49. (Finding a moral obligation for genetic engineering from two principles:
first, “it is objectively important that any human life, once begun, succeed rather than fail,” and
second, every person has the right to “define, for him, what a successful life would be.” Given
these two precepts, society should have no qualms about enhancing the capabilities of its children
so that they may have a greater choice of life paths and better odds at succeeding at whatever they
choose to do. Indeed, morality requires that society do so.”).
140. For example, parents who want their children to be athletic can equip the embryo with the
genetic material that will make the child taller, faster, stronger, and essentially more athletic.
Thus, the fetus is an objectively tall, fast, strong, and athletic human person.
141. DWORKIN, supra, note 138, at 449.
142. Except perhaps to the extent that G.K. Chesterton explored them in his poem By the Babe
Unborn. See G.K. Chesterton, By the Babe Unborn, in STORIES, ESSAYS, AND POEMS 278 (2007).
143. See Suter, Designer Babies, supra note 2, at 963. Suter discusses a Real Housewives of
Orange County episode in which a teenager whose father and grandfather were professional
baseball players is raised with the constant message that he has the genes for baseball and an
obligation to fulfill his family’s dreams of his becoming another professional player. Ironically,
the pressure to focus solely on baseball results in the son’s poor academic performance and
inability to play baseball on his high school team his senior year, which ultimately harmed his
drafting potential. This part of Suter’s paper influenced the title of my paper. “Stage mom
syndrome” is an idiom referring to a parent living out their own frustrated desires through their
children. The idea is that when genetically engineering a child, parents will choose life choices for
their children that resemble their own life choices and in the case of unattained goals parents can
take steps to ensure their children succeed where they failed.
144. Sandra Boodman, For More Teenage Girls, Adult Surgery: Rise in Breast Implants,
Other Procedures, Raises Doubts About Long Term Effects, WASHINGTON POST, Oct. 26, 2004, at
A1. Rhinoplasty remains the number one procedure for teenage girls. Boodman suggests that the
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pressures, there are a disturbing number of parents electing plastic surgery
for their teenage daughters—girls as young as fourteen are receiving breast
augmentations, rhinoplasty, and liposuction.145 Since genetic engineering
would allow parents to equip their children with cosmetic enhancements,
the demand for genetic plastic surgery is likely to be as high or even higher
than the demand for plastic surgery. But unlike plastic surgery, genetic
plastic surgery will hinge on only the parents’ conception of the good.
Therefore, to the extent that parents will use genetic engineering to
manufacture children they conceive to be valuable, genetic engineering
does violence to the autonomy of the child by treating the embryo as a mere
means to achieve the parents’ ends. In essence, the parents substitute their
will for that of the child. 146
Under an atomistic autonomy approach, genetic engineering may result
in fostering prejudice and stereotypes. 147 Allowing parents to choose
desirable genetic traits for their children may result in the devaluing of
those persons without those traits. Much like plastic surgery, genetic
engineering will result in homogeneous trait selections, 148 which could send
a message to those who opt out of genetic engineering that they are
abnormal. 149 Therefore, to the extent that genetic engineering will be used
to cosmetically enhance a child’s future, it should be regulated.
Regulation of genetic engineering and similar neoeugenic procedures
turns on whether (1) such procedures are likely to be considered
fundamental rights; and if they are, whether (2) there is a compelling state
interest to defeat a due process challenge.
III. THE CONSTITUTIONAL LANDSCAPE OF NEOEUGENICS
There is a constant tension between the extent to which the state can
compel action against individual freedom and the extent to which the state
can prevent action in accordance with individual freedom. This tension is
usually solved using a “compelling state interest” test. 150 Should the
increase in teenage plastic surgery is due to the popularity of reality shows such as “Extreme
Makeover,” “The Swan,” and “I Want a Famous Face”.
145. Id.
146. Cf. WOJTYLA, supra note 104, at 21.
147. See Suter, Designer Babies, supra note 2, at 956.
148. In plastic surgery, no one chooses to make themselves fatter, or their noses bigger,
breasts smaller (the result of those persons who have breast reduction is not smaller breasts but
more comfortable large breasts); the choices reflected in plastic surgery are for the most part
homogeneous. See also Suter, Designer Babies, supra note 2, at 960; cf., Dixon, Informed
Consent, supra note 120, at 3–4 (discussing how those with Down syndrome are selected against,
thus, limiting their communal population).
149. The pressure on young girls to have plastic surgery is only one example. An alarming
number of teenagers opt to go under the knife because of the perception that they do not fit in. The
same analogy is true of genetic engineering.
150. See, e.g., Regulating, supra note 9, at 1589.
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technology ever advance to the point where parents can, in fact, engineer
their own children, there are two compelling interests which will justify the
regulation of such technology: the autonomy of the patient and the
autonomy of the child.
A. Neoeugenics as a Fundamental Reproductive Right
An unsigned Note in the Harvard Law Review argues that the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment extends a person’s liberty
interest to include neoeugenic programs such as in vitro fertilization and
genetic engineering. 151 The Supreme Court has already determined that a
woman has a fundamental reproductive right to decide when to have a
child. For example, a woman has a reproductive right of “procreation
without state interference,” 152 the right to decide when to get pregnant, 153
and the right to terminate a pregnancy. 154 At least one district court
determined that a woman has a right to prenatal testing. 155 The Supreme
Court may soon have to determine whether women have a fundamental
reproductive right to in vitro fertilization. 156
John Robertson argues in favor of a fundamental right to in vitro
fertilization, remarking that “if bearing, begetting, or parenting children is
protected as part of personal privacy or liberty, those experiences should be
protected whether they are achieved coitally or noncoitally.” 157 He therefore
would extend those constitutionally-protected liberties to in vitro
fertilization and other reproductive enhancing technologies. 158
But abortion, contraception, prenatal testing, and in vitro fertilization
focus on the extent to which the constitution protects a woman’s right to
decide when and if to have a child. The question of whether these
protections extend to the sort of child she will have (e.g., preimplantation
genetic diagnosis and genetic engineering) remains.
151. Id. at 1578.
152. See Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 472 n.7 (1977) (citing Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S.
535, 541 (1942)).
153. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
154. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (finding that the state cannot restrict 1st trimester
abortions); Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000) (finding that the state cannot restrict
abortions into the 2nd and 3rd trimesters). But see Gonzalez v Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007)
(limiting Steinberg in that a woman’s reproductive right does not extend to dilation and extraction
(intact dilation) procedures).
155. See Regulating, supra note 9, at 1587 (citing Lifchez v. Hartigan, 735 F. Supp. 1361,
1376–77 (N.D. Ill. 1990) (holding that a woman’s constitutional right to abort her fetus must also
include a right to prenatal testing to give the woman information on which to make the decision to
abort or not).
156. Suter, Designer Babies, supra note 2, at 950; cf. Regulating, supra note 9, at 1587.
157. JOHN A. ROBERTSON, CHILDREN OF CHOICE: FREEDOM AND THE NEW REPRODUCTIVE
TECHNOLOGIES 39 (Princeton University Press 1994). See also Suter, Designer Babies, supra note
2, at 950.
158. See Suter, Designer Babies, supra note 2, at 950.
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The Note argues that the constitution already protects a woman’s right
to determine the sort of child she will have. 159 For example, “it would
almost certainly be unconstitutional for the state to prohibit citizens from
dating eugenically.” 160 In addition to eugenic dating, at least one federal
district court has already determined that a woman has a substantive due
process right to screen her fetus for genetic abnormalities. 161 And since Roe,
“eugenic abortions” are also protected. 162 But these rights do not necessarily
establish a constitutional right for a woman to decide what sort of child she
will have; they only establish a woman’s right to decide what sort of child
she will not have. 163
Advocates will nevertheless defend genetic engineering as a
fundamental reproductive right by combining three separate rights already
recognized by the Supreme Court.164 The first is the right to procreation
without state interference. 165 The second is the right “to direct the
upbringing and education of one’s children,” 166 including giving them
advantages not available to all.167 The third right is “the guarantee of marital
privacy, which extends ‘to activities relating to marriage, procreation,
contraception, family relationships, and child rearing and education.’” 168
159. See Regulating, supra note 9, at 1588.
160. Id. at 1586. The Note describes eugenic dating as dating with the goal of finding a mate
who will provide desirable genes for one’s offspring, whether such genes are for hair color or for
intelligence. I do not find this evidence compelling. While I agree that regulations on “eugenic
dating” would be unconstitutional, they would be unconstitutional for many other reasons than the
neoeugenic characteristics, such as individual liberty. The inference from eugenic dating is
weakened by the fact that many states restrict who can legally marry. For example, siblings cannot
marry, in large part, due to the genetic abnormalities that would result from such a union. In so far
as eugenic dating is posited to prove that the state is constitutionally forbidden from regulating the
types of couples who are having children, the fact that diseugenic unions (like that of brother to
sister) are regulated reveals that the state cannot prevent people from dating but they can decide
the types of relationships that will receive state benefits. This may be a type of indirect regulation.
161. See Regulating, supra note 9, at 1587 (citing Lifchez v. Hartigan, 735 F. Supp. 1361,
1376–77 (N.D. Ill. 1990) (holding that a woman’s constitutional right to abort her fetus must also
include a right to prenatal testing to give the woman information on which to make the decision to
abort or not).
162. Regulating, supra note 9, at 1587 (describing instances where women chose to abort after
finding out their fetus will be born with a serious genetic disease. These abortions are referred to
as “eugenic abortions”).
163. Even eugenic dating does not allow a person to determine what sort of child they will
have because there are innumerable ways that genes may combine. Therefore, eugenic dating—at
best—only gives a person better odds for the desired characteristics of the child.
164. See Regulating, supra note 9, at 1587–88.
165. Regulating, supra note 9, at 1587–88 (citing Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 472 n.7
(1977)); see also Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942)).
166. Regulating, supra note 9, at 1587–88 (citing Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510,
534–35 (1925)); accord Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
167. Regulating, supra note 9, at 1587–88 (citing John A. Robertson, Genetic Selection of
Offspring Characteristics, 76 B.U. L. REV. 421, 424, n.12 (1996); see also Wisconsin v. Yoder,
406 U.S. 205, 232–33 (1972)).
168. Regulating, supra note 9, at 1588 (citing Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720
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This last right, when combined with the previous two rights, creates the
constitutional foundation upon which a right to genetically engineer a child
might be found to exist. All of these rights have their foundation on what
the Supreme Court considers to be “central to personal dignity and
autonomy.” 169
The extent to which genetic engineering will be found to fall within the
liberty interests of the due process clause remains to be seen. Perhaps the
Court will agree with John Robertson that genetic engineering may “deviate
[so much] from the core interests that make reproduction meaningful as to
fall outside the protective canopy of protective liberty.” 170 Assuming
arguendo that neoeugenic programs fall within the protective canopy of the
due process clause, any attempt to regulate them will be subject to a
“compelling state interest” test. 171
B. Two Compelling Interests
Finding a compelling state interest in regulating some types of
neoeugenic procedures may be more difficult than it seems. In Lawrence v.
Texas, the Supreme Court rejected morality and ethics as the only
compelling state interests justifying the regulation of a liberty interest.172
There, a compelling state interest must do something more than reflect mere
moral disapproval. 173 Moral disapproval aside, one can imagine all sorts of
interests a state may have in regulating neoeugenics. For example, the state
may have a compelling interest in regulating the health of the embryos and
their mothers. 174 The state could regulate neoeugenics using its police
powers to the extent that neoeugenic procedures will be harmful to public
welfare or health. 175
The state also has an interest in regulating neoeugenic procedures to the
extent that they are motivated by and promote discrimination.176 Allowing a
narrowly-tailored state affirmative action program, the Supreme Court has

(1997); and Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152–53 (1973)).
169. Planned Parenthood of S. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992).
170. ROBERTSON, supra note 157, at 34; cf. Suter, Designer Babies, supra note 2, at 949–50
(“The Supreme Court has explicitly treated parenting decisions concerning education, religion,
and procreation as constitutionally protected interests, describing them as “involving the most
intimate and personal choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity
and autonomy . . . . Whether they include all manner of neoeugenic reproductive decisions
remains to be seen.”).
171. See Regulating, supra note 9, at 1589.
172. Id. (citing Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 577–78 (2003)).
173. 539 U.S. at 585.
174. Id.
175. See, e.g., David M. Nelson, The Police Powers: A Pretext for Protectionism?, 32
SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. & COM. 163, 164 (2004).
176. Cf. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 325, 343 (2003) (noting a compelling state interest
in racial diversity).
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found a compelling state interest in promoting a “cross-racial
understanding.” 177 Similarly, in striking down a Seattle student allocation
plan based on race, the Supreme Court has nevertheless affirmed the state’s
compelling interest in avoiding racial isolation.178 In the same vein, since
genetic engineering fosters discrimination against less genetically perfect
human beings, regulations of some neoeugenic programs—like genetic
engineering—could survive a Fourteenth Amendment challenge if the
Court finds a compelling interest in avoiding genetic isolation or
discrimination. 179
Given the Court’s emphasis on the liberty interests of the due process
clause—namely personal autonomy 180—two interests are particularly
compelling.
1. Patient Autonomy
Patients undergoing procedures such as genetic engineering, gene
therapy, and even amniocentesis are owed a degree of personal autonomy
with regard to medical decisions—especially reproductive decisions. 181 Yet
as discussed supra, there are numerous social pressures and remnants of
crypto-eugenics which impair true patient autonomy. Professor Suter
believes that “[perhaps] the greatest social pressure is the view that one
should undergo prenatal testing and screening because it is in the best
interests of one’s future child.” 182 “In some cases, patients actually believe
they have no choice with regard to prenatal testing or screening.” 183 Yet
prenatal testing is not without its limitations. Although doctors frequently
refer to prenatal testing as a “treatment” or “doing what’s best,” prenatal
testing often “merely ‘prevents disease’ by preventing the existence of
someone with the disease.” 184
A study in California (where doctors are required to offer prenatal
testing) revealed that doctors are “more interested in persuading [patients to

177. Id. at 330.
178. Parents Involved in Community Schools. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 783,
797–98 (2007). In his concurring opinion, Justice Kennedy affirmed the necessity of diverse
public schools, however, such diversity should not be limited to race alone but also to cultural and
economic diversity.
179. See Regulating, supra note 9, at 1590. The Note points out that “congress is probably
within its power to ban the genetic modification of a child's racial phenotype and might be within
its power to outlaw sex selection.” Id. at 1590. The legitimate state interest is more convincing
because race and sex are recognized constitutional classes. As genetic engineering becomes
mainstream and less desirable genes are more frequently discriminated against, the compelling
interest becomes more convincing for other classes of persons.
180. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562 (2003).
181. See Regulating, supra note 9, at 1586–89.
182. Suter, Designer Babies, supra note 2, at 924.
183. Suter, Routinization, supra note 77, at 255.
184. Suter, Designer Babies, supra note 2, at 924.
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undergo prenatal testing] . . . than informing patients.” 185 The American
Medical Association is well aware that in many cases, what seem to be
autonomous choices are really influenced by crypto-eugenics. 186 For
example, the Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs’ report to the AMA
revealed that, while “overt eugenics” is not a potential threat, “the aggregate
result of individual choices creates societal and cultural norms which
substantially influence or limit the scope of autonomous decision making in
regard to the use of genetic technology.” 187 While state-mandated prenatal
testing does not yet occur, the California study reveals that state-compelled
offers of prenatal testing, when combined with a policy of crypto-eugenics,
achieve substantially the same goals as a mandated testing program. 188
Given this evidence, a regulation requiring doctors to adopt a nondirective approach to genetic counseling will succeed a due process
challenge in order to preserve patient autonomy.
2. Autonomy of the Fetus
In a post-Roe era, discussing the autonomy of a fetus may seem odd.
After all, the Court in Roe v. Wade refused to opine on whether the fetus
was a human person, implying that the autonomy of the mother trumped
that of the fetus. 189 As discussed supra, the right of a woman to decide what
child she will not have and the right to decide the sort of child she will have
are fundamentally different. A right to abortion concerns the former, while
a right to genetically engineer a child concerns the later.
To the extent that a woman has decided to carry a child to term, the
fetus’s autonomy becomes increasingly relevant. Since arguments for
genetic engineering as a fundamental right assume that the fetus is alive,
there is a compelling interest in protecting the fetus’ autonomy. Dworkin
argues that, “it is objectively important that any human life, once begun,
succeed rather than fail” and that every person has the right to “define, for
him, what a successful life would be.”190 The only way for a fetus to define
for himself what a successful life would be, is to protect the fetus from
cosmetic enhancements imposed on him by his parents. Allowing parents to
185. Nancy Anne Press & Carole H. Browner, Collective Silences, Collective Fictions: How
Prenatal Diagnostic Testing Became Part of Routine Prenatal Care, in WOMEN AND PRENATAL
TESTING: FACING THE CHALLENGES OF GENETIC TECHNOLOGY 201, 216, 216 n.10 (Karen H.
Rothenberg & Elizabeth J. Thomson eds., 1994).
186. AM. MED. ASS’N COUNCIL ON ETHICAL AND JUDICIAL AFFAIRS, CEJA REPORT A – A91: ETHICAL ISSUES IN CARRIER SCREENING OF CYSTIC FIBROSIS AND OTHER GENETIC
DISORDERS
(1991)
10–11,
available
at
http://www.amaassn.org/ama1/pub/upload/mm/369/ceja_aa91.pdf.
187. Id. at 11.
188. Press & Browner, supra note 185, at 216 n.10. The study showed that 85% of women in
California chose to have prenatal testing compared with the national average of 65%.
189. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 159 (1973).
190. DWORKIN, supra note 89, at 448–49.
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cosmetically enhance their children does violence to their autonomy
because it substitutes the parent’s will for the child’s. 191 Thus, the state has
a compelling interest in ensuring that a child can define, for itself, what a
successful life would be,” and can, therefore, prohibit cosmetic
enhancements through neoeugenic procedures like genetic engineering.
IV. CONCLUSION
Neoeugenics is motivated by many of the same prejudices and value
judgments that motivated the classic eugenics era. If Professor Suter is
right, that reproductive decisions in the neoeugenic era are motivated by
“prejudice and stereotypes of different groups,” 192 then there is no moral
difference between a state’s decision to eradicate genetic “defectives” and
an individual’s decision to eliminate an undesirable genetic trait based on
the same stereotypes and biases. The coercive desire to eliminate
genetically inferior life turned the classic eugenics movement into a
monster that devoured ten million “undesirable” Jews. This same desire has
led to a modern holocaust of genetic undesirables, especially in the case of
Down syndrome. The neoeugenics movement must learn from its
catastrophic forerunner. States should enact laws that require medical
professionals and genetic counselors to take a nondirective approach when
advising patients during prenatal testing, genetic engineering, and gene
therapy in order to avoid value judgments about what constitutes a desirable
life. States should also prohibit the cosmetic enhancement of fetuses.
Neoeugenics is not all bad. Due to advancements in science, it offers
some very promising means of enhancing the quality of a person’s life. 193
Researching genetic cures and treatments for disorders should be vigorously
encouraged. But, because we make decisions in relationship to other people,
we should be cautious about how our pursuit of neoeugenic procedures
affects the personal autonomy of others. To the extent that the Supreme
Court would rely on an argument in favor of neoeugenic programs, like
genetic engineering, based on personal autonomy, the Court should not only
weigh how a regulation affects the autonomy of the parents seeking a
neoeugenic benefit, but also consider how the neoeugenic benefit would
affect the fetus—namely, respect the fetus’ own subjective ends.
Since we can never know what would have been better for a child, the
Court should allow neoeugenic programs linked to an objective good to the
fetus. Those goods which are unknown, or are reflections of the parent’s
own subjective desires, like cosmetic enhancements, should not be
permitted because it does violence to the very nature of the fetus—it treats

191. WOJTYLA, supra note 104, at 24.
192. Suter, Designer Babies, supra note 2, at 955.
193. Id. at 932–34 (discussing the potential of gene therapy and gene transfer).
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the fetus as a mere means to an end. Cosmetic or physiological
enhancements are not permissible because the ends of the embryo are never
known. However, since the most basic good of all creatures is existence,
genetic engineering is permissible only to the extent that it is used to sustain
a child’s most basic good—life.

